Beijing-backed corporations build expansive infrastructure network across Brazil

One of the largest exporters of Brazilian soybeans to China is China itself, in a way. Most exports take place through agricultural traders: Cargill, Bunge, Louis Dreyfus… They buy from farms and sell to overseas customers, handling the logistics along the way.

What happens is that, today, the second-largest grain trader in the world is Cofco, a Chinese state-owned company, second only to the American Cargill. China is the main destination for Brazilian soybeans, of course – close to 80% of our exports are shipped there. And out of the 72.5 million tonnes that Brazil sold to China in 2024, 6.65 million were transported from the farm to the port by Cofco. 9% of the total.

It is not only soy, nor only to China. Cofco is the largest exporter of agricultural products in Brazil. Last year, it exported 17 million tonnes – mainly soybeans, corn and sugar – to dozens of countries.

And this capacity is increasing. The state-owned company operated two terminals in the Port of Santos (in addition to leasing facilities from other companies). In March this year, it partially opened its third terminal, TEC (Cofco Export Terminal), also known by the technical name of the area it occupies in the largest port in Latin America: STS11.

TEC will be fully operational next year. When that happens, the company’s capacity in the Port of Santos will jump from 4.5 million tonnes per year to 14 million. It will be Cofco’s largest terminal outside China.

This does not mean that they will export exactly 9.5 million additional tonnes. A large portion will be shifted from third-party terminals to STS11. The point is that it reduces shipping costs for the company.

This was not the only measure aimed at “verticalizing” logistics, meaning controlling more stages of the export ecosystem. Cofco also purchased 23 locomotives and 979 rail cars for R$ 1.2 billion. Operated by Rumo, the trains will carry four million tonnes of grains and sugar per year from production regions to the Port of Santos beginning in 2026.

The Lego pieces

The variety of cargo port terminals is vast, but basically divided into two worlds.

One is that of bulk terminals – the case of STS11. Everything goes loose, without individual packaging. Instead of stacked soybean bags, the ship receives a river of grains falling through a conveyor belt.

The other port world is that of container terminals. iPhones, T-shirts, airplane parts, medicine… everything goes in these standardized boxes. It is as if global trade were made of Lego: the same container stacked on a ship becomes a rail car or the back of a truck and continues its journey without anyone having to open the door and unpack everything.

For that reason, standardized containers are an invention not much less important than the wheel.

Well then. 11% of the 14 million containers handled in Brazil (for import, export or cabotage) pass through TCP – the Paranaguá Container Terminal (PR).

And since 2018, TCP has been part of the portfolio of another state-owned company from Xi Jinping’s country, China Merchants Port Holdings (CMPorts). It is the largest container operator in China. And now one of the largest here too. More precisely, number three: in container volume (1.6 million/year) it is behind only Santos Brasil (2.3 million) and BTP, a joint venture of European logistics companies (1.8 million).

It may even move up in the ranking. CMPorts signed an agreement with the government in early November committing to invest R$ 1.5 billion in expanding the terminal.

Check below a historic overview of long-haul container handling via the Port of Paranaguá. The chart was prepared with DataLiner data and excludes transshipment, cabotage, and other internal movements:

Long-haul Container Handling in the Port of Paranaguá | Jan 2022 to Sept. 2025 | TEU

Source: DataLiner (Click here to request a demo)

And this is not its only investment in Brazil. On to the next one.

The “Eike port”

Remember Eike Batista? So. At the beginning of the century, he planned to build a mega ecosystem of companies that would feed into one another. It started with a mining company (MMX) and an oil company (OGX). To supply energy to their facilities, he created a thermal power company (MPX). Fuel for the plants would come from his coal mine (CCX). He also planned a shipyard (OSX) and the Port of Açu (LLX), in the state of Rio de Janeiro, which would have bulk terminals to ship OGX oil and MMX iron ore.

Time passed, things changed, but the port survived. The American fund EIG bought Eike’s control in 2013 and created Prumo Logística to develop the Port of Açu. Today it has 11 terminals, and the oil terminal accounts for 30% of Brazilian oil exports – the port receives vessels from offshore platforms and transfers the crude to tankers for export.

Which brings us back to CMPorts.

In February 2025, the Chinese state-owned company signed an agreement to buy 70% of the oil terminal – with the remaining 30% staying with Prumo. The deal is not finalized. It needs regulatory approval and fulfillment of certain contractual requirements.

If the deal closes, CMPorts would control the logistics of 21% of Brazilian oil exports (that is, 70% of what is currently in Prumo’s hands).

Even so, one of China’s largest recent investments in Brazil in infrastructure has nothing to do with exporting commodities. It involves transporting people: a passenger train between São Paulo and Campinas.

The São Paulo–Campinas train

The idea of connecting São Paulo and Campinas by train is as old as trains. And it was materialized more than 150 years ago. The first railway between the state capital and the largest city in the interior began operating in 1872. By the end of the 20th century, however, the service was slow and precarious. And it ended in 1999.

But the dream of a modern train linking the cities never disappeared. It went through the never-completed Rio–SP–Campinas bullet train. But it is finally expected to leave the drawing board through the Intercity Train – a concession auctioned by the government in 2024.

And who won? 60% went to the Constantino family (via Grupo Comporte, their land-transport holding) and 40% to another Chinese state-owned giant, CRRC. It is the largest train manufacturer in the world and holds 90% of the Chinese market.

Investment in the Intercity Train is expected to reach R$ 14 billion. R$ 8.98 billion will be provided by the state government. Considering that CRRC is responsible for 40% of the remainder, we are talking about R$ 2 billion. The inauguration is planned for 2031.

It is easy to understand the motivation of the Chinese government – controller of the state-owned companies – in projects involving oil and soy logistics, or container flows in Paranaguá: that is how a large share of Chinese imports enter Brazil. But what is China’s strategy with the Intercity Train? Revenue there will come from selling tickets to Brazilians, something far removed from Beijing’s interests.

But ticket revenue is not the only source of income. “From the perspective of the Chinese government, the returns are larger. When you enter a concession like this, you also profit by supplying the trains, bringing in a Chinese construction company…”, says Juan Landeira, Infrastructure Director at the consultancy Alvarez & Marsal. “You sell technology. You sell know-how.”

Indeed. CRRC will build the Intercity Train rolling stock. And not only that. The state-owned company won a contract this year to manufacture 44 trains for the São Paulo Metro, beating the French Alstom, a traditional supplier to the state government. The contract is worth R$ 3.1 billion.

To assemble the trains, CRRC began operating a factory in Araraquara. It previously belonged to the South Korean Hyundai Rotem (which built the trains for São Paulo’s Yellow Line). The plant was taken over in October, and from there the Intercity trains will also be produced.

The interconnections go further. The electricity that powers China’s projects here partly comes from China itself. State Grid, from the Chinese government, controls CPFL, which accounts for 15% of electricity distribution in Brazil. China Three Gorges (CTG) accounts for 3.5% of Brazilian power generation. And both purchase solar panels from China, which is responsible for 80% of global production. With oil it is the same. Part of what arrives at the Port of Açu, now targeted by CMPorts, comes from CNOOC, CNPC and Sinopec – Chinese oil companies operating in Brazilian waters.

In short, it is the same logic Eike Batista dreamed for himself: an ecosystem of giant companies in which one feeds another, multiplying the controller’s revenue behind all of them. Only two differences: with the Chinese government in that role, the scale is monumental. And it is working.

Source: Invest News

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